In this article, Christopher Felton, Will Castledine and Kerrie Duffy of Gardner Leader examine key developments and pivotal court decisions in 2026 concerning legal professional privilege (LPP).
This article explores the boundaries of legal advice privilege (LAP) and litigation privilege (LP) in light of recent rulings, including Aabar Holdings SARL v Glencore Plc [2026] EWHC 877 (Comm) and Uber London Ltd v White [2026] EWHC 1610 (Comm). It highlights the growing impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on confidentiality, referencing the warning notice from the SRA and key rulings on open and public AI tools. Additionally, this article analyses the scope of the iniquity exception, the lack of legislative override under section 44B of the Solicitors Act 1974 following Carter-Ruck Solicitors v SRA [2026] EWHC 2416 (KB), and the serious procedural consequences of “privilege hunting” as demonstrated in Salinas Pliego v Astor Asset Management 3 Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 940.
2026 has seen significant decisions in the ever-developing area of legal professional privilege (LPP). Taken together, these decisions show that courts are willing to take a pragmatic view of privilege, but are alert to its limits: confidentiality and privilege may be lost through careless use of AI, the iniquity exception remains narrowly confined, and attempts to obtain an opponent’s privileged material may carry serious procedural consequences. With appeals understood to be pending in Aabar and Carter-Ruck, 2027 is likely to bring further clarification.
Legal advice privilege (LAP): Aabar Holdings SARL v Glencore Plc [2026] EWHC 877 (Comm)
Quintessentially, LAP subsists in communications between a solicitor and their client that have come into existence for the dominant purpose of giving or receiving legal advice. However, in Aabar, Picken J:
- Held, as a matter of authority and principle, that LAP extends to intra-client documents and communications created for the dominant purpose of seeking legal advice [16].
- Recognised, as “obviously the case”, that LAP attaches to a lawyer’s working papers [60].
The claimants sought disclosure of documents generated and circulated within the “client group”, arguing that Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No. 5) [2003] QB 1556 confined LAP to communications between solicitors and that group, subject to limited exceptions.
Picken J held that Three Rivers (No. 5) concerned “non-client” (not intra-client) documents [22], and that LAP subsisted in intra-client documents created for the dominant purpose of seeking legal advice [75].
Litigation privilege (LP): Uber London Ltd v White [2026] EWHC 1610 (Comm)
LP protects communications made with third parties where litigation is in progress or contemplation, and with the dominant purpose of conducting that litigation (Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No. 6) [2005] 1 AC 610).
In the context of the claimants’ reliance on section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980, the court in Uber v White considered the dominant purpose limb in relation to documents generated during their solicitors’, Mishcon de Reya (MdR), earlier retainer with their funder.
The claimants resisted disclosure on two bases:
- LP subsisted in the documents. The court rejected this, holding that the dominant purpose during the funder retainer was to enable the funder to consider funding the litigation, not to conduct it.
- The documents were not in their control. The claimants relied on a retainer provision stating that MdR was not obliged to make available information obtained from acting for other clients or derived from other sources. The court rejected this too, holding that MdR owed the claimants a fiduciary duty to disclose material relevant to their claim obtained during the funder retainer, which a confidentiality provision could not displace.
In White v Uber London Ltd [2026] EWHC 2651 (Comm), Birt J went on to determine the preliminary issue on limitation in favour of the defendants.
Confidentiality: UK v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] UKUT 81 (IAC); Illiquidx Ltd v Altana Wealth Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 874
LPP depends on confidentiality, an established principle that has assumed particular significance with the expanded use of open and public AI tools.
In UK v SSHD, the Upper Tribunal considered the use of generative AI by legal representatives. It held that uploading confidential documents to an open or public AI tool such as ChatGPT (as distinct from a subscription-based, enterprise-grade or closed tool) releases that information into the public domain, resulting in the loss of confidentiality and the waiver of any associated privilege.
Although not a privilege case, Illiquidx offers a useful comparison. The Court of Appeal held that “public domain” in a professionally drafted NDA bore its established meaning in the law of confidence: information must be sufficiently accessible to the public such that it can no longer be regarded as confidential. Disclosure to one person does not suffice.
Relatedly, in August 2026, the SRA published a warning notice on the misuse of AI, raising concerns about inaccurate AI-generated material and failures to mitigate risks to client confidentiality. It is therefore increasingly important for practitioners to understand how AI systems process information and how their clients interact with these tools.
The iniquity exception: Bourlakova v Anufriev [2026] EWHC 1747 (Ch)
In a dispute concerning the ownership of $3 billion in assets, the court considered the iniquity exception in relation to the instruction of enquiry agents by the claimants through their solicitors, MdR.
MdR instructed the agents, received their reports, and relayed their conclusions to the clients. On becoming aware that they had received privileged documents, MdR instructed separate counsel solely to conduct a privilege review before receiving further reports.
The defendants alleged that the instruction of the agents was iniquitous and had yielded the confidential and privileged information “on an industrial scale”. They sought disclosure of the claimants’ communications with the agents, contending that no LPP could subsist in them due to the iniquity exception.
Dismissing the application, Richards J held that:
- The exception requires an iniquity established to the requisite standard, with a sufficient connection between it and the otherwise privileged documents. The iniquity must take the lawyer-client relationship outside the normal scope of a professional engagement, or involve an abuse of a relationship.
- The claimants’ and MdR’s genuine belief that the agents acted lawfully and that any privileged material came from a whistleblower (rather than hacking) showed that their instruction was not iniquitous and fell within the “ordinary run” of the lawyer-client relationship.
- Setting in train a process that might yield confidential information is not iniquitous per se. A rule to that effect “would risk having a chilling effect on the ability of claimants to obtain evidence in cases of suspected fraud”. Instructing counsel to screen the material was therefore not an iniquitous purpose.
No legislative override to LPP under section 44B of the Solicitors Act 1974: Carter-Ruck Solicitors v SRA [2026] EWHC 2416 (KB)
The SRA investigated data protection and defamation claims threatened and brought by Carter-Ruck’s client, Mr Amersi, and issued three production notices to Carter-Ruck under section 44B of the Solicitors Act 1974.
Carter-Ruck denied any wrongdoing and sought a declaration that the SRA is not entitled under section 44B to require the production of material subject to LPP.
The SRA argued that it requires the power to compel the production of privileged documents, particularly when investigating complaints by a non-client where the interests of solicitor and client are aligned, and that:
- On the authorities (Parry-Jones v Law Society [1969] 1 Ch 1 and Simms v Law Society [2005] EWHC 408 (Admin)), section 44B of the 1974 Act is a legislative override of the common law right to LPP.
- Alternatively, disclosure to the SRA is not an infringement of a party’s LPP.
As to the legislative override, Butcher J rejected each route to an implied override. The basis for implying an override in relation to section 35 interventions did not apply to section 44B, with its absence being an impediment to investigations rather than a bar. The analogy with the production powers under section 147 of the Legal Services Act 2007 and section 46(11) of the 1974 Act gave rise to no necessary implication. The Barras principle did not assist because Parry-Jones did not concern a precursor to section 44B, and this reasoning would require Parliament to be taken to have had regard to other decisions undermining the SRA’s construction.
Butcher J considered himself bound by Sports Direct International plc v Financial Reporting Council [2021] Ch 457 to reject the argument that disclosure to the SRA would not infringe LPP.
It is understood that the SRA is seeking permission to appeal from the Supreme Court, having obtained a leapfrog certificate from the High Court.
“Privilege hunting”: Salinas Pliego v Astor Asset Management 3 Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 940
Salinas concerned “privilege hunting”, the practice of dishonestly obtaining or seeking an opponent’s confidential and privileged information. Private investigators engaged by the claimants covertly induced the defendants’ solicitor to disclose perceived weaknesses and litigation and settlement strategy, secretly recording and passing the information to the claimants.
The Court of Appeal held that this conduct amounted to a very serious abuse of process: a sufficient nexus between the misconduct and the proceedings abused was established, and it was not necessary to establish that a fair trial had become impossible. The possibility that some material might not ultimately attract privilege, including under the iniquity exception, did not legitimise the operation, since the claimants could not have known in advance what would be obtained or whether it would be privileged.
Privilege hunting does not, however, automatically result in a claim being struck out, as the court’s response must be proportionate. Here, the substantive fraud claim was permitted to continue, but the freezing orders obtained by the claimants were discharged.
Salinas is an extreme example, but it shows that deliberate attempts to circumvent the confidentiality of an opponent’s solicitor-client communications may amount to an abuse of process with serious procedural consequences, even where a fair trial remains possible.
(Compare with Bourlakova, where the instruction of enquiry agents was held not to amount to privilege hunting.)
Reproduced from Practical Law with the permission of the publishers. For further information visit www.practicallaw.com.